Commission to Address Federal Deficit is an Affront to Representative Democracy

by Karl Kurtz

U.S. Senators Kent Conrad (N.D.) and Judd Gregg (N.H.) have proposed the creation of a commission to address the federal deficit.  For Congress to give up the power of the purse to this commission would be to relinquish its fundamental responsibility in our system of representative democracy.

The commission would be made up of 18 members--four members of Congress selected by each of the four congressional party leaders, the secretary of the treasury and one other member selected by the president. At least 14 of the members of the commission would have to agree to make recommendations to cut the federal deficit.  The Congress would then consider the recommendations after the 2010 elections under expedited procedures, no amendments allowed, and a super-majority would be required to pass the proposal.

This proposal has been kicking around for a while but has new currency because Conrad and Gregg propose to attach it to the must-pass debt limit resolution in the next week or so.

Yesterday, Denise Baer, a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University and a consultant sent an e-mail message to political scientists who study legislative politics

to urgently request that you consider adding your voice asking Congress to say “no” to this unprecedented, undemocratic, and unnecessary voiding of traditional legislative prerogatives.

Here is the heart of her argument:

For Congress to “outsource” its legislative powers in such a wholesale way (as Sen. Max Baucus put it) is wrong, and risks reducing congressional oversight and accountability at a time when public will is diverse and lacking for the type of hard decisions that must be made.  In my view, to seek to educate the public AFTER a task force or commission has prepared non-amendable legislation...is both backwards and anti-democratic...AND is partisan in that it reflects congressional deference to a special interest set of economic interests unable to win at the polls.  We political scientists know better -- that ALL interests are special, and it is the special role of Congress to transparently and democratically represent the melding of public views in authoritative legislation (as Professors Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing and Kurtz have so persuasively reminded us in Republic On Trial).  

Whoa!  I didn't expect--but am pleased--to find Republic on Trial:The Case for Representative Democracy cited in this discussion.  I'm glad Ms. Baer finds our argument persuasive that it is the role of legislatures to resolve the many disagreements and competing interests in our society through a process of debate, negotiation and compromise.

The notion of an 18-member commission preparing a deficit reduction package for an up or down vote, without the process of debate, negotiation and compromise among elected representatives of all of the people, is antithetical to our system of representative democracy.  As Lee Hamilton points out in Strengthening Congress, the framers of the Constitution wanted the power of the purse to be held by "the immediate representatives of the people," in James Madison's words.

The solution to the seemingly intractable federal deficit problem is not for Congress to give up--to say "no mas" and turn the problem over to a commission.  Instead, it should carry out the same kind of robust and complex debate on the federal deficit as it is currently doing on health care.  This is what Congress was designed to do.  Lee Hamilton says of the health care debate in "What It Looks Like When Congress Does Its Job":

I guarantee you that whatever the final measure looks like, no one will be entirely satisfied. Yet legislating is not the art of the perfect, it's the art of the possible. We have a Congress precisely in order to pursue this "dialogue of democracy," and to produce, in the end, an ambitious piece of legislation with the legitimacy to be accepted among a broad cross-section of Americans.

Would a commission-produced federal deficit reduction package have that legitimacy?  Not for me.

Note: NCSL has no position on the Conrad-Gregg proposal.  These views are entirely my own and not those of NCSL.

Comments

[Solomon Kleinsmith]

Congress is not giving its power up when it puts together a commission like this, it entrusts the power in this group, using a form similar to that used on contentious issues like military base closings and the 9/11 commission to try and filter out some of the power play issues and special interest leverage.

They get to vote on the final bills, and even have to make a supermajority vote to pass the stuff. Precisely how does that take power out of their hands?

Harkening back to the framers is absurd. They also didn't want the Senate to be directly elected and didn't think most people should be allowed to vote.

[Karl Kurtz]

Solomon, this proposed commission is substantially different from other commissions in the past. The base closing commission also provided for an up or down vote by Congress, but its scope was very narrow. This proposed debt relief commission could potentially completely override all congressional policy and spending decisions. The recommendations of the 9/11 and Greenspan commissions were not binding and did not force an up or down vote with no amendments. Parts of both of those commissions' reports were accepted by Congress, some were amended, and others were rejected. That would not be possible under the proposed Conrad-Gregg commission.