by Karl Kurtz
Yesterday's Sacramento Bee has a good story, "Budget brawl boosts lure of majority vote," on discussions in California about removing the state's two-thirds majority requirement to pass a budget in the wake of the budget impasse in the legislature that ended last week. The story quotes one of my colleagues as follows:
Arturo Pérez of the National Conference of State Legislatures, which represents state lawmakers, said California is one of three states that have a two-thirds majority requirement on budgets. Arkansas and Rhode Island are the others.
"Simple majority is the rule of the land," Pérez said. Even Congress passes budgets with a simple-majority vote, as do most cities and counties.
With Republicans the minority party in California for most of the past several decades, the higher voting threshold for budgets has given them a say on the state's annual fiscal plan. This year, Republicans used that power to delay passage of the budget for 52 days.
Pérez cautioned, however, that a simple majority will not ensure an on-time budget. He pointed to North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Illinois as three simple-majority states that failed to pass their budgets on time this year.
"There's so many elements involved in any type of legislation, and the budget is simply the largest example of that," Pérez said. "It's too simplistic to say if we had X, we'd have Y."
Arturo's wise comment that changing the rules of the game will not necessarily produce ontime budgets is a corollary of a principle espoused by political scientist E.E. Schattschneider in a classic 1960 work, The Semisovereign People. Schattschneider's principle of the displacement of conflict says that institutional structures or rules may affect when and where battles occur but that they don't cause the conflicts to go away.
Budget battles in the states are a good illustration of this idea. The rules of the game vary greatly from state to state. For example, the Maryland Constitution prohibits the legislature from increasing the governor's budget, only allowing the General Assembly to decrease line items proposed by the governor. Does this eliminate negotiation and compromise between executive and legislature? No, it means that legislative leaders who want to influence the budget have to make their priorities known to the governor before the budget is submitted. Maryland governors pay attention to legislative priorities for fear that they may have to sustain unwanted budget cuts, if they don't respond to the leaders.
Budget battles are usually the most visible conflicts in American politics because the stakes are highest, and they are the greatest test of wills between political parties and branches of government. In our two-party, separation-of-powers system, there will always be conflicts between Republicans and Democrats, governors and legislatures, even between chambers, regardless of the rules of the game.
This is not an argument for or against a two-thirds vote vs. majority rule on budget bills in California--or any other rules change. There may indeed be good reasons for changing the rules--in California or any other state--and thereby affecting when and how conflict over the budget occurs. Instead, it is a caution that a rules change will not eliminate the disagreements and the need for effective negotiation and compromise to resolve them. It is, as Schattschneider's book is subtitled, "a realist's view of American democracy."